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Abstract
This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of
one party due to the pattern of electoral districting a®ects policy choice.
We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party
competition and show how this a®ects party strategy in theory. The
usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government
in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties
to moderate their policies.
¤We are grateful to Jim Alt, Robert Barro, Andrew Chesher, Steve Coate, Antonio Merlo,
Costas Meghir, Francesco Trebbi and Frank Windmeijer as well as two anonymous referees
for useful comments. The paper has also bene¯tted from discussions with numerous seminar
participants.
11 Introduction
One of the central issues in political economy is to understand how electoral
incentives shape economic policy outcomes. The dominant model of party
competition following Downs (1957) models the consequences of parties com-
peting for votes by making policy promises. The benchmark median voter
result suggests that it is voters' preferences rather than political institutions
that determine policy outcomes.
The new generation of political economy research gives more weight to how
institutions a®ect policy. This paper focuses on one important institution { the
design of the electoral system. It looks speci¯cally at how districting bias in
favor of a party a®ects electoral incentives and policy outcomes. The paper
develops a theoretical approach and an empirical application. En route, it dis-
cusses how data on the relationship between seats and votes can be incorporated
into the study of policy formation.
The basic framework adopted is one in which two parties compete for elec-
tion by o®ering policy platforms in a majoritarian electoral system. Voters
are either partisan (committed to a particular party) or independent. The lat-
ter, which we refer to as swing voters, play a key role in determining election
outcomes as parties compete for their voters with their platform choices. Vot-
ers are distributed across districts which are heterogeneous, containing di®erent
fractions of partisan and swing voters. Such heterogeneity can either be by
design, as in the case of partisan gerrymandering, or due to constraints imposed
by geography or history.
The distribution of voters across districts a®ects the way in which votes
are translated into seats. A uniform distribution of partisan and swing voters
across districts implies that a party will win seats in proportion to its vote share.
An electoral system is said to be biased in favor of one party in so far as an
equal split of the votes between the parties translates into an unequal division
of the seats. As we discuss further in the next section, there is a large empirical
literature on the measurement of this kind of bias.
Parties must decide how far to formulate their platforms to please their core
(partisan) supporters or appeal to swing voters. The key focus for party strategy
2is the location of the median district, i.e. the one that they need to win in order
to have a majority of seats. If the core support of a party is concentrated,
then the median district will be easier to win as a smaller proportion of swing
voters will need to be won over in order to win the election. A key insight
of the paper is to show that the extent of core support in the median district
is equivalent to a statement about bias in the electoral system. This provides
a link between the theory of electoral strategy and the empirical study of the
relationship between seats and votes.
The theory suggests an empirical approach that we illustrate using English
local government data. The estimation strategy is recursive. First we estimate
the bias in the electoral system. We then relate this measure of bias to policy
outcomes. The results suggest that electoral bias in favor of a party leads to
more extreme policy outcomes, i.e. those that favor its core supporters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates
the paper to a number of literatures in economics and political science. Section
four develops the theoretical approach. Section three links this to the seat-
votes relationship implied by the model and states our main result. In section
¯ve we develop an application. Section six concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper pulls together ideas from three distinct literatures: models of voting
with a mixture of partisan and swing voters, the empirical relationship between
seats and votes, and strategic models of party competition. We brie°y review
how this paper relates to each.
A world comprising partisan and swing voters is a central tenet of the Michi-
gan election studies beginning in the U.S. in the 1950s.1 Partisans are core
supporters who are strongly committed to a given party while swing voters are
those whose party attachment is weak. While the nature of partisan attachment
in this framework is still much debated (see, for example, Green et al (2004)),
the basic idea remains relevant and most survey data collected on voters and
1The classic reference { Campbell et al (1960) { has in°uenced work on voting by political
scientists for more than a generation.
3voting behavior uses these categories to classify the electorate. This approach
is straightforwardly combined with a probabilistic voting model of the kind that
is now popular in the political economy literature (see, for example, Persson and
Tabellini (2000)).
As we noted above, there is a long-standing interest in political science in
modeling the empirical relationship between seats and votes.2 For a two-party
system, this can be represented in general by a seats-votes curve { a real value
function mapping the share of the votes received by one party, denoted here by
P, into its share of the seats, denoted by S which we write as S = f (P). An





2, i.e. a party that wins
half of the votes fails to win half of the seats. The slope of the function f (P)
represents the responsiveness of the electoral system. The case of f0 (P) = 1
for all P 2 [0;1] represents proportional representation.
The existing political economy literature on electoral systems (for example
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004)) has tended to adopt a rules driven approach
to classifying an electoral system. The seats-votes curve suggests a di®erent
way of looking at this, focusing on bias and responsiveness.
Given that data on seats and votes are in plentiful supply, there has been a
lot of interest in measuring f (P) empirically and the implied bias and respon-
siveness. Traditionally this has been done by specifying a functional form for












In this case, the parameter ® represents bias while ¯ represents responsiveness.
Perfect proportional representation is given by ® = 0 and ¯ = 1. Majoritarian
electoral systems typically yield ¯ > 1 and to the extent that districting favors
one party, then ® 6= 0.
The empirical model in (1) has a long history. Kendall and Stewart (1950)
famously postulated the \cube law" for British elections where ¯ = 3. The
model is developed further in Gelman and King (1994a,b), Quandt (1974) and
King (1989). King and Browning (1987) estimate this model on U.S. data.
Gelman and King (1994a), among others, have emphasized that bias in the
2For an overview, see Taagepera and Shugart (1989).
4electoral system is a®ected by the way in which the boundaries of districts are
drawn.
The curve f (P) has not featured to date in theoretical models of partisan
politics. In part, this is because, it is has no clear \micro-foundations". This
paper shows how the relationship f (P) can be derived in general from an under-
lying model featuring a mixture of partisan and swing voters who are resident in
electoral districts. We also derive necessary and su±cient conditions on prim-
itives that yield the parametric model (1): This gives an exact interpretation
of ® based on the skewness of a particular distribution relevant to partisan and
swing voter support.
The building blocks that we use are similar to those of Coate and Knight
(2007), the only other paper of which we are aware that tries to micro-found
the seats-votes curve. They too begin with distributions of partisan and swing
voters and use their apparatus to look at optimal seats-votes curves for a spec-
i¯ed social welfare function. They apply this to U.S. state level data. Their
paper links to an earlier literature on optimal partisan gerrymandering in which
a party tries to draw district boundaries to maximize its seat share { see, for
example, Owen and Grofman (1988).
The ¯nal issue concerns the impact of the seats-votes curve on policy. Coate
and Knight (2007) adopt a citizen-candidate approach in which each party puts
up candidates of a given type who then agree on policy in a legislature. Policy
is then a®ected by the pattern of districting because this has an impact on the
composition of the legislature. The mechanism here is somewhat di®erent. We
use a model of electoral competition of the kind introduced by Calvert (1985)
and Wittman (1983). Parties have policy preferences which re°ect the views
of their partisan supporters. In this framework, districting a®ects policy by
changing the incentives of parties to appeal to swing voters in order to get
elected.
The paper contributes to somewhat broader debates about the value and
consequences of political competition.3 A number of commentators have dis-
cussed how voters may bene¯t from more vigorous competition, but there is no
agreed upon framework for studying this issue. A good example is discussion
3See Stigler (1972) for an early discussion.
5of the pros and cons of one-party systems. In his in°uential commentary on
the one-party south Key (1949) argues that \In the two-party states the anxiety
over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the
have-less elements of society," (Key (1949), page 307.) This was institutional-
ized in part by partisan gerrymandering in favor of the Democratic party. To
study this requires a way of thinking about the underlying forces that shape
political advantage. To date, the literature has tended to focus on realized
political outcomes, such as seat shares, to measure political advantage.4 But
this is conceptually °awed since, in models of strategic party competition, these
political outcomes are endogenous. If the parameters of the seats-vote curve {
f (P) { can be measured independently of the policy process, then this provides
a natural way into modeling the consequences of factors that a®ect political ad-
vantage in favor of a particular party. The framework developed here makes
progress on this and suggests a recursive estimation strategy.
The focus of this paper is on bias inherent in districting. This is distinct
from the large literature on incumbent bias in congressional elections in the
United States. That begins from the empirical observation that congressional
legislators enjoy a signi¯cantly increased chance of being re-elected over time.5
The policy concern is with whether such bias diminishes the accountability of
legislators to the electorate. This makes a lot of sense in an individualistic
system like the U.S. where the personal vote matters signi¯cantly. In an Eng-
lish context from which we draw our application, parties dominate legislative
decision making and this kind of bias is less of an issue. Thus the analysis that
we develop is a natural counterpart to the literature on individual legislators.6
4The U.S. political science literature often uses the Ranney index based on seats and
Gubernatorial voting data. Rogers and Rogers (1999) and Besley and Case (2003) show
that competitiveness measures based on legislative seats are correlated with policy outcomes
in U.S. state level data. This is readily computed using state level data. Holbrook and
van Dunk (1993) experiment with a more disaggregated measure using district level data on
incumbent's winning margins.
5See, for example Erikson (1971).
6Some contributions have linked incumbency bias and districting bias. For example, Tufte
(1973) argued that incumbents used gerrymandering in the U.S. to create incumbency bias.
However, these two kinds of bias are conceptually distinct. Moreover, Ferejohn (1977) argued
that behavioral change in the electorate rather than redistricting was most likely responsible
63 Theoretical Preliminaries
We are interested in understanding the incentives for parties to pick policies
and how this depends on the relationship between seats and votes. In time-
honored tradition, we model two parties competing for o±ce by choosing policy
platforms. The model will show how the equilibrium policy platforms depend
upon on an empirically relevant model of electoral bias.
3.1 Preferences and Actions
The economy comprises three groups of citizens denoted by µ 2 fa;0;bg. These
labels denote the loyalties that the citizens have to two parties { labelled a and
b with type `0' citizens being independent, i.e. not attached to a party. We will
refer to type 0 voters as swing voters and the others as partisan voters.
The citizens' utility depends on an L-vector of policies y1;:::;yL that a®ect
their utility. The set of feasible policies is denoted by a compact set Y .7
Preferences over these policies are denoted by a bounded utility function V (µ;y)
for a voter of type µ. Partisan voters receive an additional additive component
to their utility denoted by ­½ (½ 2 fa;bg) if their preferred party is in o±ce.8
Let
y¤ (µ) = argmax
y2Y
V (µ;y)
denote the optimal policy of type µ.
3.2 Politics
Two parties compete for election. We suppose that their memberships com-
prise only partisan citizens and that they maximize the average welfare of their
members. For z 2 [V (0;y¤ (0));V (0;y¤ (½))], consider the following Pareto
for the increase in incumbency bias in the U.S..
7The government budget constraint is embodied in Y .
8This could correspond to a behavioral model of party loyalty { viewing party attachment
as something akin to support for a football team { or else it could represent unmodeled ¯xed
policy preferences on key issues such as state ownership.
7e±ciency problem for ½ 2 fa;bg:




V (0;y) ¸ z:
This picks the best level of utility for the party subject to delivering a certain
utility level for the swing voters. Let ^ y (z;½) be the policies generated by this
program.
We model parties as competing by picking utility levels from the range
z 2 [ V (0;y¤(0)); V (0;y¤(½)) ]
{ anything else would be ex post Pareto dominated: This begs the question of
whether parties can commit to o®ering something other than their ideal policy.
This could be ¯nessed by assuming that candidate selection is a commitment
device as in Besley and Coate (1997) or by assuming that parties play a repeated
game with the voters as in Alesina (1988).9
Let v½ be the utility level being o®ered to the swing voters by party ½ 2
fa;bg. We use ¡½ to denote the other party. Let V (z;½) = V (^ y (z;¡½);½)
for ½ 2 fa;bg be the policy-related utility of a partisan voter when the other
party is in o±ce and has o®ered a utility level of z to the swing voters.
We assume that type a and type b voters remain loyal to their parties. The
swing voters weigh up their utility from voting for each party. We model them
using a fairly standard probabilistic voting model of the kind used extensively
in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Swing voter utility is a®ected by two \shocks",
an idiosyncratic shock ! which has distribution function F (!) and an aggregate
shock ´ with distribution function H (´). Thus a swing voter with shocks (!;´)
prefers party a over party b if:
! + ´ + [va ¡ vb] > 0:
The ¯nal component of this expression is the utility di®erence (va ¡ vb) between
having party a and b in o±ce.
9See Besley (2006) for further discussion.
84 Votes and Seats
The model can be used to generate a theoretical seats-votes relationship. Sup-
pose voters are distributed in a continuum of equal sized districts. Each district
may contain a di®erent fraction of swing and partisan voters. Speci¯cally, sup-
pose that in any particular district, there are ¾ voters of type 0 and (1 ¡ ¾)
partisan voters. Furthermore (1 + ¹)=2 of partisan voters support party a in
any particular district. Thus ¹ > 0, denotes an advantage to party a. We
now show how the joint distribution of ¾ and ¹ across districts a®ects election
outcomes.
First observe that party a wins a seat in which the share of swing voters is
¾ and it has an advantage in terms of partisan voters of ¹ if and only if:









i.e., it obtains more than half the votes. Rearranging the expression shows that






> 2F (¡´ ¡ [va ¡ vb]) ¡ 1:
Let G(³;¤) be the distribution function of ³ with parameters ¤ = (¹ ¹; ¹ ¾;¾¹)
where ¹ ¹ is the mean of ¹, ¹ ¾ is the mean of ¾ and ¹¾ is the mean of ¹¾:
It is now straightforward to see that party a's seat share is given by:
Sa = 1 ¡ G(2F (¡´ ¡ [va ¡ vb]) ¡ 1;¤); (2)








¹ ¾ (2F (¡´ ¡ [va ¡ vb]) ¡ 1) +
1
2
(¹ ¹ ¡ ¹¾). (3)
10The new variable ³ de¯ned here can be interpreted as party a's majority from partisan
voters expressed relative to the number of swing voters, a natural measure of the party's
electoral advantage in a district. The fact, established below, that deriving the properties
of the seats-votes relationship requires consideration only of the properties of the univariate
distribution of ³ as opposed to those of the bivariate distribution of ¾ and ¹ considerably
simpli¯es the analysis.
9Substituting (3) into (2) now yields the following theoretical seats-votes rela-
tionship:










¹ ¾ . This reveals the crucial role played by the shape of the
distribution function G(¢;¤) and its associated parameters ¤: This seats-votes
relationship does not depend on the policy choices of the two parties which have
been substituted out since they a®ect both votes and seats in a similar way.11
This implies that the relationship in (4) is identi¯ed independently of the policy
choices made by parties and underpins the recursive empirical strategy outlined
below.
Equation (4) can be used to de¯ne electoral bias quite generally as the seat
share that party a receives when it obtains ¯fty per cent of the vote. Thus








It is clear that the magnitude of the bias depends on how ¸ deviates from the
median of the distribution of ³; i.e. bias is zero when G(¸;¤) = 1
2.
But how to estimate (4) is not entirely clear. One approach is to adopt
the popular parametric log-odds formulation discussed in section 2 above. To
rationalize this in our framework requires ¯nding a functional form for G(³;¤)












Our main theoretical result derives the conditions under which we can move
from (4) to (5). The result also shows that appropriate parameters, ¤, can be
found to rationalize any such seats-votes curve.12 We state this as:
Proposition. For any ® 2 R and ¯ 2 R+ there exist ¹ ¾ 2 [0;1], ¹ ¹ 2 [¡1;1] and
11The critical assumption here is that the policy vector y cannot be targeted to speci¯c
districts.
12There will typically be many distributions G(¢;¤) that can generate a given seat vote
curve. All we require for this result is that there there exists one value of ¤.




















1 ¡ ¹ ¾³ + ¹ ¹ ¡ ¹¾
1 + ¹ ¾³ ¡ ¹ ¹ + ¹¾
¸¯#¡1
for ³ 2 [¡1;1].


















provided m 2 [¡1;1].
We prove this proposition as the implication of a result for a more general
linear seats-votes relationship (of which (5) is a special case) in Appendix I.13
The Proposition shows that, for the case where (5) holds, the median can
be decomposed into two parts { (i) a factor ¸ which depends upon the average
advantage in partisan votes (¹ ¹), the average fraction of swing voters (¹ ¾) and the
covariance between ¾ and ¹ and (ii) a factor f (®;¯) 2 [¡1;1] which depends
upon the bias and responsiveness coe±cients calculated from the seats-votes
relationship. This is a useful decomposition since the latter term isolates the
skewness of the districting distribution of electoral advantage separately from
mean voting preferences. The model identi¯es districting bias with skewness
in the distribution of seats and votes. As ® moves further away from zero, the
distribution G(³;¤) is more skewed.
13Speci¯cally, the Lemma in the Appendix gives necessary and su±cient conditions for any
seats-votes curve in the class:
Á(Sa) = ® + ¯Ã (Pa):
11There are three useful and important properties of the function f (®;¯).
First f (0;¯) = 0 in which case the median of the distribution equals the mean
and there is no skewness in the distribution. Second, f (®;¯) is increasing in
® and hence is increasing in bias. Third, f (®;¯) is decreasing in ¯ and thus
skewness is decreasing in responsiveness.
Since (4) is derived from a theoretical model, this result will help to provide
a link between the measurement of bias and responsiveness in electoral models
and policy incentives. We now show that the parameter m {the median of the
distribution G(¢;¤) { a®ects the political equilibrium.
5 Political Equilibrium
Party a wins the election if it takes half the seats. This requires that ´ be
su±ciently high that:





´ > ¡[va ¡ vb] ¡ ·
where · = F¡1 ¡1
2 (1 + m)
¢
is an increasing function of the median of the dis-
tribution of ³.14 The ¯rst term, [va ¡ vb], represents the policy advantage of
party a if it o®ers more to the swing voters while the second term, ·, depends
upon m. A higher median, m, re°ects greater concentration of party a's core
support which makes it more likely that party a wins a majority for a given
policy advantage.







. Then the probability that party a wins the election for ¯xed






, then · =
m=Á.
12(va;vb) is:




1 if » [· + va ¡ vb] ¸ 1
2
1
2 + » [· + va ¡ vb]
0 if » [· + va ¡ vb] · ¡1
2 .
(6)
A higher value of · increases the probability that party a wins: Moreover, with
a su±ciently high value of ·, party a wins for sure.
Parties compete by picking utility levels for the swing voters. A political
equilibrium is a pair of promises to the swing voters (~ va; ~ vb) which form a Nash
equilibrium, i.e.
~ va = argmaxv2[V (0;y¤(0));V (0;y¤(a))]f
£1
2 + » [· + [v ¡ vb]]
¤³








~ vb = argmaxv2[V (0;y¤(0));V (0;y¤(b))]f
£1
2 ¡ » [· + [va ¡ v]]
¤³








At an interior solution, the ¯rst order conditions are:
»
h






+ » [· + [~ va ¡ ~ vb]]
¸
^ Vv (~ va;a) = 0
for party a and
»
h






¡ » [· + [~ va ¡ ~ vb]]
¸
^ Vv (~ vb;b) = 0
for party b.
From these, it is clear that ·, and hence m, a®ects electoral incentives. This
provides a direct link (using the Proposition above) between seats-votes bias and
the choice of policy since, as we saw there, the parameter m depends upon ®
and ¯.
To get a better feel for how the model works, suppose that y is a scalar
2 [0;1] with party a having preference at y¤
a = 1; party b having preference at
y¤
b = 0 and the swing voters preferring y¤
0 = 1=2. Preferences are Euclidean, i.e.
13­r¡ky ¡ y¤
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+ ­b + ·
¶
:
In this case ~ ya and ~ yb are both increasing in ·, i.e. bias towards a leads
both parties to move their policy platforms in the direction preferred by party
a supporters. Hence in jurisdictions biased towards a, we should see party
a moving towards its preferred outcome and in jurisdictions where the bias is
towards b, we should see party b moving its policy platform towards outcomes
preferred by its core supporters b. This is a key prediction that we test below.16
More generally, we can write equilibrium policies predicted by the model as:
~ y`½ = ^ y` (½; ~ v½) (7)








for ½ 2 fa;bg and ` = 1;:::;L. As in the example, electoral bias as represented
by ® has an e®ect on policies via its impact on ~ v½.
While the Euclidean preference model gives a clean and instructive answer,
the theoretical direction of electoral bias on any speci¯c policy is uncertain a





¡ ­a + · · 1 and ¡ 1 · · ¡
1
2»
+ ­b · 0:
16This example can also be used to think about how policies can be made credible using
candidate selection along the lines of Besley and Coate (1997). Suppose that parties pick
\leaders" to deliver platforms. They can pick their leader form an array of candidates with
ideal points [Ya;1] for party a and [0;Yb] for party b with Ya > 1
2 > Yb. This puts an additional
constraint on the policy choices which may or may not be binding. For further discussion, see
Besley (2006). Coate and Knight (2006) use a model where political selection determines ex
post policies. It would be interesting to consider a more general approach (encompassing the
model in this paper and their approach) where the selection of candidates on a seat-by-seat
basis a®ects the legislative bargain and/or leadership election after the election.
14each issue. Ultimately, therefore, it is an empirical question which policies are
a®ected by electoral bias.
6 An Application
6.1 Background and Data
Our application comes from local governments (called councils) in England for
the years 1973-98.17 As in many countries, local authorities provide of a variety
of public services which have an impact on people's daily lives. They deal with
public housing, local planning and development applications, leisure and recre-
ation facilities, waste collection, environmental health and revenue collection.
Representatives (called councillors) are elected to serve on a geographical basis.
The basic geographical unit (district) is a ward, generally returning between one
and three council members, and usually three. Ward boundaries are determined
by a politically independent commission which carries out electoral reviews in
each local government area at periodic intervals.18 In all types of authority,
17The system is somewhat complex involving a mixture of single and two tier authorities.
There is a single tier of government in London and other metropolitan areas since 1988. Since
1995, there has been a move towards a single tier system throughout England via the creation
of shire authorities. However, London and metropolitan areas before 1988 and all shire
(rural) areas before 1995 and most of them since responsibilities are split between two levels
- a higher level county council and a lower level district council. Where such a split exists the
current allocation of functions is roughly as follows. District councils deal with public housing,
local planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste collection,
environmental health and revenue collection. County councils deal with education, strategic
planning, transport, highways, ¯re services, social services, public libraries and waste disposal.
Where there is a single tier it typically covers all of these functions (although in London and
metropolitan areas transport, ¯re and waste disposal are handled by joint bodies). In 1990,
the break down was 12 inner London boroughs, 20 outer London boroughs, 36 metropolitan
districts and 296 shire districts. For an earlier study of seats-votes bias in English local
elections and references to previous literature on that subject, see Johnston, Rallings and
Thrasher (2002).
18Electoral cycles vary depending on type of authority. County councils and London bor-
oughs elect all members at a single election every four years. Metropolitan districts elect by
thirds, returning a third of their members on a rotating basis in each of three out of four years.
15elections are conducted on a ¯rst-past-the-post basis, returning the candidates
with most votes, irrespective of whether or not any gains an absolute majority.
The tax raising power of these local authorities is limited with only around
25% of expenditures being funded by local (property) taxes. The remaining
budget is ¯nanced from (block) grants from central government. There are
three main parties competing for o±ce { Conservative, Labour and Liberal
Democrats. They communicate platforms to voters mainly through lea°et
drops focused on local issues. However, party reputation at the national level
may also be a factor in shaping voter loyalties. The Conservative and Labour
parties dominate in the national political arena. However, the complexion of
local government contests is more heterogeneous. One aspect of this is the
relative importance of independent representatives in local politics. We create
a catch-all grouping which we call \others" in our data and which comprises
independents and other minor parties.19
The Conservative party (the party of Margaret Thatcher) is traditionally
a right wing party and has a reputation for desiring smaller government and
lower taxation at both local and national levels. The Labour party (the party
of Tony Blair) is the traditional party of the left while the Liberal Democrats
are mostly viewed as mildly left of centre. We would expect these underlying
party preferences to show up in the policies chosen under di®erent patterns of
political control.
We classify a party as being in control of a local authority if it holds more
than 50% of the seats on the council. A small number of local authorities
are in the hands of independents in which case we classify them as \other"
control. Finally, there are councils that are not controlled outright by anyone
{ \no overall control". Since many local governments have multiple competing
parties, they do not ¯t the theoretical model particularly well. Hence, the
empirical analysis is con¯ned to those local authorities which are essentially
\two party" in the sense that there two parties which controlled more than 75%
Shire districts, whether unitary or not, have a choice to opt for either system and changes
between the two systems are permitted.
19While local candidate reputations clearly play a role in the elections that we are studying,
it remains plausible to believe that party attachments are important.
16of the seats in every year between 1973 and 1997. This gives a sample of 150
local authorities compared to the universe of 364. To check robustness, we
also look at sub-sample of these (108) where the competition is between the
Labour and Conservative party. We will use information about seats and votes
to construct measures of districting bias in each local authority. The data are
available at the district (ward) level. For uncontested wards (approximately
7% of the sample), we impute the vote share with the average for the party over
the sample period.20
Table 1 reports political outcomes for the 150 local authorities that we study.
The table gives the mean of actual political control over our sample period. It
also gives the break down of our sample by region and by class of local author-
ity. In spite of restricting the sample to 150 two-party authorities, a broad
regional distribution remains as well as a selection of the di®erent authority
types. Since we have four party groupings, there are six possible varieties of
political competition. The distribution of the sample over these types among
the authorities is also given in the Table 1.
The main period for which we have \policy data" is 1980-1998. For each
local authority, we have ¯nance data and expenditure. We also get employment
in each local authority administration for full time and part time workers. In
addition, we have some background socioeconomic data from the Census and
other sources. The main economic controls that we use are (log of) household
income in each district, the level of unemployment and the (log of) population.
Since 1994, we have data available on a range of outcomes from the Audit
Commission, which was set up in 1992 to monitor the performance of local
government. The sample means of the controls and policy variables are given
in Tables 1 and 2.
6.2 Empirical Method and Results
The above discussion motivates the following recursive empirical approach. We
¯rst use data on seats and votes to estimate parameters of the seats-vote re-
20The results are not sensitive to the exact method used to deal with this. Gelman and
King (1994b, Appendix A) discusses some alternatives.
17lationship ® and ¯. We then use these estimated parameters to see whether
electoral bias a®ects policy outcomes.
6.2.1 Bias
Let j denote a jurisdiction and ¿ an election date. There are four parameters





We assume that ¯j¿ = ¯ and ¹ ¾j¿ = ¹ ¾ are common parameters across dis-
tricts21, ¸j¿ = ¸j is indexed by j, the local jurisdiction, but constant over time
and we decompose ®j¿ = ®j + ²j¿ into a ¯xed authority component ®j and a
time-varying authority term ²jt. We assume ²jt is an innovation unknown to
political agents at the time of policy decisions and distributed identically and
independently of (¸j;®j) so that parties can be assumed to take decisions based


















The estimated parameters are then used to construct f (®j;¯) which will be
used to explain economic policy choices.
The relationship between votes and seats, controlling for local authority
e®ects, is illustrated for the main sample of 150 local authorities and the 108
authorities in the "Labour-Conservative subset" respectively in Figures 1 and
2. The ¯gure is constructed by ¯rst regressing both log odds of seats and log
odds of votes on a full set of authority dummies, then plotting the relationship
between residuals. In each case, we add both the OLS regression and a semi-
parametric estimate of the relationship using the same data22.. The closeness
21The proof of the Proposition in Appendix I establishes that it is always possible to ¯nd
authority speci¯c ¸j and common ¹ ¾ compatible with the estimated seats-vote relationship.
Though it is not necessary to have the same ¹ ¾ in all jurisdictions, making the assumption
here removes an issue of coe±cient heterogeneity in the policy regressions.
22The semi-parametric estimates ¯t a non-linear relationship to the residuals using locally












18of the plots suggest a fairly good ¯t for the linear log-odds relationship between
seats and votes.
Results from estimating (8) for elections between 1973 and 1997 are given
in Table 3. As we would expect in a majoritarian system, the control of seats
varies more than proportionately with changes in votes, i.e. the responsiveness
parameter ¯ exceeds one. The point estimate is 1.89 in sample of 150 two
party jurisdictions and 2.27 in the smaller sample of 108 Conservative-Labour
jurisdictions.
Using the results from (8), we recover the ®j parameter for each of our local
authorities.23 A Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the values of
®j are equal across local authorities in either sample. The next step is to use
these estimated values of ®j to construct our measure of districting bias when
party r controls in local authority j at time t as:
biasrjt = (2±rjt ¡ 1)f (®j;¯):
For the sake of illustration, Figure 3 gives the distribution of (average) bias
in favour of the controlling party in each local authority for the sample of 150
two-party authorities. Unsurprisingly, this bias tends to be positive { parties
are in control more often when bias is in their favour. This is borne out by
looking at the di®erence in political control in districts with bias and ¯nding
that the larger party tends to have bias in its favor.
6.2.2 Policy
Let yr`jt be policy outcome ` in jurisdiction j in year t when party r 2 fa;bg is
in o±ce where ` = 1;:::;L. Our basic policy equations are of the form:
yr`jt = »rj + »`j + »`t + ½`r (2±rjt ¡ 1)f (®j;¯) + ±rjt (9)
+°`x`jt + ´r`jt
23For ¯ve of our local authorities: East Cambridgeshire, Hackney, Islington, Southwark and
Surrey Heath, the second placed party received no seats in one or more years. This would
not be a problem except for the log formulation of the seats-votes relationship. In these
cases, we estimates the bias parameter on the years where seats are not zero for the second
placed party and set it to missing in years when the second placed party receives no seats. In
practice, this is a very minor issue.
19where »rc are region dummy variables, »`c are dummy variables for the type
of authority, »`t are year dummy variables, ±rjt = 1 if party r is in o±ce in
district j in year t, and x`jt is a vector of exogenous regressors varying at the
jurisdiction level that also a®ect policy.
It is plausible to expect swing voters to have more centrist policy preferences.
If this is true, then parties would tend to moderate their policy preferences
when facing less electoral bias in their favor. Thus, our empirical speci¯cation
allows for districting bias to have a di®erent e®ect on policy depending on which
party is in o±ce as would be the case in theory if parties have di®erent policy
preferences.
The theory suggests that policy choices depend upon the median of the
distribution of ³ in jurisdiction j, i.e.




This implies that the error term in (9) contains:
´r`jt = ½`r (2±rjt ¡ 1)¸j + 'r`jt:
where ¸j is treated as a random e®ect. We will also allow the distribution of
'r`jt to be heteroskedastic.24
The actual estimation is laid out in detail in Appendix II. It shows how
we deal with two further econometric issues. First, we need to allow for the
generated regressor bias in the standard errors due to the fact that ®j and ¯
are estimated in (8). Second, since there are four parties rather than two, we
estimate these policy equations for di®erent (a;b) pairs in di®erent jurisdictions.
Moreover, since we are studying competition between the main two parties in
every jurisdiction, we need to introduce a third possibility (no overall control)
24Since we assume a ¯xed ¯ and district-speci¯c ®j Appendix I proves that that it is
consistent with theory to have constant ¾ and then ¸j deterministically related to ®j and
¯. In that case we would interpret the estimated coe±cient on f(®j;¯) as coming through
¸j. In that the case the random e®ect captures authority level speci¯c e®ects germane to
the policy in question. If ¾ is not constant then ¸j could vary orthogonally to f(®j;¯) and
this would be absorbed by the random e®ects. In this case, we have a random coe±cient
which induces heteroskedasticity in the error term. Our estimation procedure covers both
possibilities.
20in which neither party has a majority of the seats. This will be the baseline
category in the estimations that follow.
We take total local authority expenditures per capita as a core example to
illustrate our ¯ndings. These are reported in Table 4. We begin in column (1)
of Table 4 by showing the relationship between bias and expenditure with only
region, class of authority and year dummies as controls, without di®erentiating
between party control and estimating by OLS (with standard errors corrected
for the use of generated regressors). The relationship between bias and total
spending is positive and signi¯cant { incumbents with more bias in their favor set
higher expenditures. This relationship holds up when controls are introduced
for grants received, income, unemployment and population as is done in column
(2). This reduces the coe±cient on bias considerably but it remains signi¯cant.
The coe±cients on these controls are sensible { higher grants being correlated
with higher expenditures. Column (3) adds in dummies for political control
but no interactions between this and bias. Conservative party control reduces
expenditures while control by any of the other parties increases it, although not
signi¯cantly in the case of \other" control. The coe±cient on bias falls further
in this column, but remains positive and signi¯cant, albeit at less than 5%.
Column (4) allows bias to have a di®erent e®ect depending on which party
controls the council. The e®ect of bias for Labour and Liberal Democratic
control is positive and signi¯cant. The sign under Conservative party control
is negative. Thus bias appears to exaggerate the consequences of party control
as measured in column (3). These e®ects are stronger still when we move to
the random e®ects estimation in column (5) which deals with the full set of
issues discussed in the context of equation (9). All e®ects of bias are larger and
more signi¯cant. Finally, in column (5), we test the robustness of this ¯nding
to looking only at the Conservative-Labour sub-sample. In this instance, bias
leads to an increase in expenditure only in Labour controlled councils.25
25Consistency of our estimates of ½`r relies on consistency in estimation of the ®j and
therefore on number of observed election cycles used for estimation becoming large in each
jurisdiction. In practice the length of this time dimension is fairly small and we need therefore
to recognise the possibility of attenuation bias arising at the second stage as a consequence
of inaccuracy in the estimation of the districting biases ®j. Note that, as with classical
measurement error, this will make it more di±cult for us to establish evidence of an e®ect.
21Together these results suggest that bias in favor of the incumbent does have
a signi¯cant e®ect on the expenditure level in a local authority. It appears
as if, in line with the theory, less bias leads to parties compromising on their
spending preferences { higher spending parties reduce their spending and low
spending parties increase it when bias is smaller. The e®ects are of a reasonable
size. A one standard deviation increase in bias increases spending under Labour
control as much as a 12% increase in average income and leads to a similar sized
reduction in spending under Conservative control.
The remaining tables investigate whether these ¯ndings are an artefact of
picking total expenditure as an outcome measure. From now on we report only
the GLS speci¯cation of (9). Table 5 concentrates on taxes.26 The ¯rst column
is for the size of the local tax. Council taxes, a form of property taxation, are
interesting as they are set locally and are highly visible to residents. The tax
varies according property value with each property assigned to a value band.
As our policy measure, we use the tax on a particular standardized property
value (Band D). Column (1) shows that there is a positive and signi¯cant e®ect
of bias on the size of this tax under Labour control { a one standard deviation
increase in bias leading to a 1% increase in the size of the tax. Column (2)
looks at whether bias a®ects the cost of tax collection. The e®ect of bias is
not signi¯cant in this case. Column (3) looks at the percentage of tax collected
that is owed to the local authority. There is some evidence here that those
jurisdictions with more bias tend to have lower tax collection e®ort regardless
of who controls the local authority.
Having observed in Table 4 that total expenditures are a®ected by bias,
Table 6 looks at their composition. For leisure spending and spending on
parks, we ¯nd e®ects that parallel the results in Table 4 with Labour favoring
higher spending and Conservatives less. For spending on refuse collection it
Appendix II.4 shows that this bias should be a similar proportion of the true value ½`r across
di®erent policies ` and suggests a way to estimate the magnitude of the bias. Applying this
formula to results in column (5) suggest that the bias towards zero could be about 49% of the
true coe±cient for Labour, 35% for the Conservatives, 15% for the Liberal Democrats and
21% for others.
26These data come from an organization called the Audit commission and are for a shorter
time period than the data in Table 4.
22appears that bias under Liberal Democratic control increases spending while
they spend less on transportation. These results are consistent with parties
having di®erent policy preferences.
Table 7 looks at employment by the local authority. In column (1), we look
at the (log of) total employment. Again, we ¯nd strong e®ects of bias di®eren-
tiated by type of party control. Bias under Labour control leads to increases in
employment while, under Conservative control, it leads to retrenchment. This
accords well with what would expect from ¯rst principles. A one standard de-
viation increase raises full time employment under Labour control by 6% and
reduces it by around 3% under Conservative control.
In Table 8, we look at a variety of other policy data from the Audit Commis-
sion. Provision of cheap social housing is a typical policy that might appeal to
Labour's traditional support but would likely be unattractive to Conservative
voters who are more likely to be owner-occupiers. Column (1) shows that more
bias under Labour control tends to be associated with greater rent collection in
public housing while column (2) shows that there are lower management costs in
public housing as bias increases under Labour control. There is weak evidence
that bias under Labour control reduces rents on social housing while it increases
such rents under Conservative control (column (3)). There is little evidence
that bias a®ects planning and the costs of administering bene¯ts (columns (5)
and (6)).
Overall, the results provide convincing evidence that bias matters for policy
outcomes. Consistent with the theory, the results suggest that parties try
to appeal more to swing voters by moderating their \true" party preference
when elections are more competitive (electoral biases are reduced). Particularly
persuasive in this respect is the ¯nding that electoral bias increases spending
and public employment under left-wing (Labour) control while reducing them
under right-wing (Conservative) control.
7 Concluding Comments
A key function of political economy models is to identify how political incen-
tives shape policy choices. Despite a plethora of theoretical models, there are
23relatively few e®orts to build links to empirical estimation. This paper has
put forward an approach that links theory and data by exploiting the empirical
relationship between seats and votes. The core theoretical idea that is taken
to the data is that bias towards one party induced by districting skewed in its
favor will make that party more keen to o®er policies to suit its core supporters
rather than swing voters.
To illustrate the usefulness of the approach, the paper has developed an
application to English local government data. We show how the key parameters
can be identi¯ed and used to explain policy. In line with theory, there is
evidence that parties moderate their policy stance when they have less bias in
their favor.
The results presented here contribute to debates about the consequences of
electoral districting. The pattern of districting is one of the key choices in an
electoral system and generates signi¯cant policy interest. However, this issue
has largely been left alone by the new political economy literature.27 The
¯ndings in this paper suggest that understanding the policy consequences of
districting bias does require exploring its implications for the policy strategies
formulated by political parties.
27Coate and Knight (2007) whose contribution is discussed above is the main exception.
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27Appendix I Proof of Proposition
The Proposition is proved as an implication of the following lemma.
Lemma. For any ® 2 R and ¯ 2 R+ and for any increasing, surjective Á; Ã :
(0;1) ! R there exist ¹ ¾ 2 [0;1], ¹ ¹ 2 [¡1;1] and ¹¾ 2 [¡1;1] such that
Á(Sa) = ® + ¯Ã(Pa) (A.1)
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(A.2)
for ³ 2 [¡1;1].


























provided m 2 [¡1;1].
Proof. From (3) the widest possible range for Pa as F(¡´ ¡ [va ¡ vb]]) ranges
from 0 to 1 is
¹ ¹ ¡ ¹¾ ¡ ¹ ¾ + 1
2
· Pa ·
¹ ¹ ¡ ¹¾ + ¹ ¾ + 1
2
:
Suppose that (A.1) holds or equivalently
Sa = Á
¡1 (® + ¯Ã(Pa))




2 ]. This corresponds to (4)







and hence (A.2) holds for ³ 2 [¡1;1].
If ³ lies outside the range [¡1;1] then the number of swing voters is fewer
than one or other party's majority among partisan voters and all such seats are
won by the dominant party whatever policy platforms va and vb are o®ered and
irrespective of the realization of ´. The shape of the seats-votes curve does not
therefore restrict the continuation of G(³;¤) to ³ = 2 [¡1;1].
We need to show that there exist ¹ ¾ 2 [0;1], ¹ ¹ 2 [¡1;1] and ¹¾ 2 [¡1;1]
such that these can correspond to the appropriate means if (A.2) holds. To see
that this is possible, suppose that ¾ = 1
2 everywhere so that ¹ ¾ = 1
2, ¹¾ = 1
2¹ ¹
and therefore ³ = ¹. Given these values, the mean of ³ must therefore equal ¹ ¹.
Note that we are free to set G(³; ¹ ¹; 1
2; 1
2¹ ¹) however we want for ³ = 2 [¡1;1]
provided only that we preserve the properties of a distribution function. Suppose
therefore that G(³; ¹ ¹; 1
2; 1
2¹ ¹) = 0 for ³ < ¡1 and G(³; ¹ ¹; 1
2; 1
2¹ ¹) = 1 for ³ > 1.
28The di®erence between the mean of ³ and ¹ ¹ is
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and










· (1 ¡ ¼0) + ¼0 ¡ 1 = 0
using the fact that ¡1 · G¡1(¼; ¹ ¹; 1
2; 1
2¹ ¹) · 1 for all ¼ and all ¹ ¹.
Since ¢(¹ ¹) is a continuous function there must therefore be a ¹ ¹ 2 [¡1;1]
such that ¢(¹ ¹) = 0 as required.
The formula for the median (A.3) follows simply by inversion.





in these formulae gives the expressions for
G(³;¤) and m in the Proposition.
Appendix II Estimation
Consider estimation of the model for one performance indicator yit in isola-











: Consider ¯rstly the basic model in which
29incumbent bias e®ects are the same for all parties. Such a model combines
equations
sit = ®i + pit¯ + uit i = 1;:::;N t = 1;:::;T1
yit = ½witf(®i;¯) + Xit° + ´it i = 1;:::;N t = 1;:::;T2
where T1 denotes the number of time periods available to estimate the votes-
seats relationship, T2 the number of time periods available to estimate the per-
formance equation and N the number of authorities in the cross section. Here
sit denotes the log odds of seat share and vit the log odds of vote share for one
party, wit denotes a variable taking values 1, 0 and -1 according to whether that
party, no party or its opponent have control of the authority and Xit denotes
a row vector of all other relevant variables including time and region dummies
and dummies for party control.
In matrix form write this as
s = D1® + p¯ + u
y = ½Wf + X° + ´
in an obvious notation.
II.1 Seats Votes Relationship
















We use these estimates to construct estimates of the bias variables
^ f = f(^ ®; ^ ¯)






where r(®;¯) denotes the Jacobian matrix (@f=@®0 @f=@¯).
30II.2 OLS Performance Regressions

































































assuming existence of the appropriate probability limits, taken as N ! 1.
Consistent estimators of standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are
based upon corresponding sample moments of the residuals (with appropriate



























































Allowing incumbent bias e®ects to di®er by party involves extending ½ to
a vector of e®ects on interactions of f(®i;¯) with indicators of party control.
Corresponding variance formulae follow by similar reasoning incorporating the
appropriate matrix products.
31II.3 GLS Performance Regressions
Note however that there is good reason to expect correlation between observa-
tions within authorities because of the common in°uence ¸i. This suggests a
random-e®ects structure. Suppose E(´i´0
i) = ­i and ^ ­i is a consistent estima-
tor of ­i. Let ^ ­ denote the block diagonal matrix constructed in the natural


































































assuming again that the appropriate probability limits exist.
Consistent estimators of standard errors are based upon corresponding sam-














































1Z1)¡1 ^ rW0^ ­¡1Z2:
It remains only to describe the calculation of ^ ­. We set ^ ­i = ^ µ1 IT2 +
^ µ2 1T210
T2 for all i, estimating ^ µ1 and ^ µ2 from the within- and between-authority
sample moments of the pooled OLS residuals ^ ´O according to the formulae in
Baltagi (1995, p.182).
II.4 Small sample bias
Consistent estimation of ½ requires T1 ! 1 so that estimation error in ^ ® dis-
appears. For ¯nite T1, estimation imprecision in ^ ® creates an e®ective mea-
surement error issue at the stage of the performance regressions and therefore
small sample attenuation bias in estimates of ½ (and °). Speci¯cally, taking the


























































33The proportional bias in estimation of ½ is independent of the performance
indicator in question (except in so far as that a®ects the sample which can be
used for estimation).
Note also that a putative estimate of the bias is available since the variance
of u can be estimated using the seats-votes data and the ¯rst stage regression
results - speci¯cally, ^ u0^ u=NT1 consistently estimates E (u0u). This could be
used as the basis of small-sample-bias-corrected estimates of ½ and °. However,
while this should reduce small-sample bias it is not clear how it would a®ect
precision of the estimator and it is quite possible that mean square error could
increase. We prefer therefore to report the uncorrected but consistent estimates
while noting the possible magnitude of bias implied by (A.5).
34Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Variable Mean
Characteristics



































Standard deviations are in parentheses.Table 2: Performance Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
ln Total Expenditure 5.0760 1.0645
Band D Tax 6.4212 0.1651
Tax Collection Costs 17.3802 5.3117
% Tax Collected 0.9423 0.0406
ln Leisure Expenditure 1.9408 0.7480
ln Parks Expenditure 2.0657 0.7982
ln Refuse Expenditure 2.2357 0.2883
ln Transport Expenditure 1.3827 1.6882
ln Total Employment 2.6274 0.8749
ln Full Time Employment 2.3368 0.7728
ln Part Time Employment 1.0997 1.2349
% Rent Collected 0.9852 0.0225
% Housing Management Costs 10.2545 5.1089
Average rent 40.3254 9.7625
Planning decisions within 8 weeks 0.7374 0.1164
Bene¯t costs 81.2243 32.7658
Table 3: Seats Votes Regression
All Lab-Con
Variable Coe® Coe®
ln odds Vote Share 1.883 2.269
( 0.137 ) ( 0.071 )
Sample size 1004 747
R2 0.868 0.911
Standard error 0.321 0.171
WAuth 985.925 483.793
p value 0.000 0.000
OLS estimates of (8). Standard errors in parentheses are ro-
bust to heteroscedasticity. Dependent variable is ln odds Seat
Share. All regressions contain a full set of authority dummies
and WAuth is a Wald test of absence of authority di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
149.Table 4: Total Expenditure Regressions
All Lab-Con
OLS GLS GLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe®
Pro inc bias 0.407 0.111 0.026 . . .
( 0.079) ( 0.047) ( 0.046) . . .
Pro inc bias * Lab . . . 0.160 0.625 0.844
. . . ( 0.064) ( 0.159 ) ( 0.238 )
Pro inc bias * Con . . . -0.352 -0.552 -0.504
. . . ( 0.111) ( 0.163 ) ( 0.256 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem . . . 0.174 0.409 .
. . . ( 0.148) ( 0.199 ) .
Pro inc bias * Oth . . . 0.313 -0.021 .
. . . ( 0.153) ( 0.244 ) .
Characteristics
ln Average Income . 0.058 -0.032 -0.029 0.215 0.371
. ( 0.097) ( 0.091) ( 0.092) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.141 )
ln Population . -0.315 -0.206 -0.193 -0.099 -0.111
. ( 0.024) ( 0.027) ( 0.027) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.049 )
ln Unemployment . 0.403 0.311 0.301 0.244 0.260
. ( 0.017) ( 0.018) ( 0.019) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.026 )
ln Per Capita Grant . 0.055 0.063 0.060 0.004 -0.004
. ( 0.010) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.010 )
Political control
Labour . . 0.094 0.087 0.011 0.017
. . ( 0.016) ( 0.016) ( 0.018 ) ( 0.021 )
Conservative . . -0.111 -0.091 -0.026 -0.048
. . ( 0.020) ( 0.021) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.022 )
Liberal Democrat . . 0.153 0.142 0.065 .
. . ( 0.027) ( 0.027) ( 0.028 ) .
Other . . -0.003 0.021 -0.026 .
. . ( 0.026) ( 0.030) ( 0.039 ) .
Sample size 2133.000 2133.000 2133.000 2133.000 2133.000 1535.000
No of years 14.000 14.000 14.000 14.000 14.000 14.000
µ1 . . . . 0.133 0.140
µ2 0.079 0.048 0.043 0.043 0.164 0.168
WClass 19855.103 4814.180 5392.707 660.042 207.376 1.466
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.690
WRegion 140.206 109.713 114.396 6257.870 2168.757 825.494
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
WY ear 1590.053 333.443 249.976 258.298 174.363 104.532
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OLS and GLS estimates of (9). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation
error in the districting advantage variable. Dependent variable in all regressions is log
of total expenditure.
µ1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and µ2 the common component to the stan-
dard error. WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di®erences, asymp-
totically distributed as Â
2
3. WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
8. WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2 with degrees of freedom one less than the number of
years.Table 5: Tax Regressions
Band D Tax Tax Collection Cost % Tax Collected
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coe® Coe® Coe®
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.323 4.322 -0.064
( 0.105) ( 3.815) ( 0.026 )
Pro inc bias * Con -0.190 -4.329 -0.154
( 0.141) ( 7.078) ( 0.059 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.087 -2.678 0.000
( 0.118) ( 5.140) ( 0.031 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.489 13.707 0.021
( 0.261) ( 10.254) ( 0.060 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.020 0.103 -0.011
( 0.082) ( 4.236) ( 0.027 )
ln Population -0.031 -0.199 -0.018
( 0.034) ( 1.421) ( 0.009 )
ln Unemployment 0.070 -1.359 -0.004
( 0.021) ( 1.019) ( 0.006 )
ln Per Capita Grant -0.017 1.321 -0.015
( 0.013) ( 0.862) ( 0.005 )
Political control
Labour -0.015 0.698 -0.003
( 0.012) ( 0.625) ( 0.004 )
Conservative -0.035 -0.869 0.021
( 0.015) ( 0.916) ( 0.007 )
Liberal Democrat 0.032 0.272 0.003
( 0.022) ( 1.016) ( 0.006 )
Other -0.041 1.229 -0.003
( 0.046) ( 1.776) ( 0.010 )
Sample size 720.000 569.000 569.000
No of years 4.000 3.000 3.000
µ1 0.107 3.522 0.020
µ2 0.058 2.223 0.015
WClass 16.838 5.835 47.817
p value 0.001 0.120 0.000
WRegion 35.313 42.112 69.516
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
WY ear 51.806 3.304 4.392
p value 0.000 0.347 0.222
GLS estimates of (9). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation error in
the districting advantage variable.
µ1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and µ2 the common component to the stan-
dard error. WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di®erences, asymp-
totically distributed as Â
2
3. WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
8. WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2 with degrees of freedom one less than the number of
years.Table 6: Expenditure Regressions
Leisure Parks Refuse Transport
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe®
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.613 1.364 0.208 1.464
( 0.365) ( 0.370) ( 0.165) ( 0.694 )
Pro inc bias * Con -1.368 -0.810 -0.435 0.283
( 0.402) ( 0.319) ( 0.170) ( 0.703 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 1.091 -0.040 0.474 -1.376
( 0.491) ( 0.344) ( 0.214) ( 0.945 )
Pro inc bias * Oth 0.151 -1.725 -0.567 -1.319
( 0.610) ( 0.893) ( 0.329) ( 1.614 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income -0.103 0.232 0.016 -1.119
( 0.252) ( 0.213) ( 0.121) ( 0.566 )
ln Population 0.140 0.836 0.068 -0.160
( 0.104) ( 0.103) ( 0.047) ( 0.190 )
ln Unemployment 0.138 -0.130 -0.079 0.035
( 0.049) ( 0.042) ( 0.023) ( 0.104 )
ln Per Capita Grant -0.026 0.009 0.001 -0.058
( 0.017) ( 0.014) ( 0.008) ( 0.038 )
Political control
Labour 0.136 0.040 0.031 -0.029
( 0.041) ( 0.036) ( 0.020) ( 0.089 )
Conservative 0.028 -0.032 -0.033 0.017
( 0.044) ( 0.036) ( 0.021) ( 0.091 )
Liberal Democrat 0.038 -0.001 0.099 -0.179
( 0.065) ( 0.054) ( 0.031) ( 0.143 )
Other -0.175 -0.389 -0.142 -0.459
( 0.095) ( 0.135) ( 0.053) ( 0.265 )
Sample size 2118.000 2131.000 2132.000 1910.000
No of years 14.000 14.000 14.000 14.000
µ1 0.400 0.465 0.168 0.595
µ2 0.364 0.322 0.177 0.783
WClass 24.045 68.670 12.696 3.281
p value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.350
WRegion 25.289 54.578 70.724 275.041
p value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
WY ear 59.154 27.438 20.471 75.203
p value 0.000 0.017 0.116 0.000
GLS estimates of (9). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation er-
ror in the districting advantage variable. Dependent variable in all regressions is log
expenditure.
µ1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and µ2 the common component to the stan-
dard error. WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di®erences, asymp-
totically distributed as Â
2
3. WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
8. WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2 with degrees of freedom one less than the number of
years.Table 7: Employment Regressions
ln Total Employment ln Full time ln Part time
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coe® Coe® Coe®
Pro inc bias * Lab 1.342 1.430 0.922
( 0.242) ( 0.245) ( 0.326 )
Pro inc bias * Con -0.706 -0.671 -0.874
( 0.191) ( 0.182) ( 0.303 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.478 0.651 -0.461
( 0.242) ( 0.284) ( 0.419 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.057 0.205 -1.399
( 0.254) ( 0.265) ( 0.763 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.093 0.030 0.362
( 0.133) ( 0.125) ( 0.236 )
ln Population 0.268 0.310 0.103
( 0.047) ( 0.045) ( 0.084 )
ln Unemployment 0.011 0.006 -0.002
( 0.023) ( 0.022) ( 0.041 )
ln Per Capita Grant 0.005 0.008 0.004
( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.014 )
Political control
Labour 0.037 0.032 0.083
( 0.022) ( 0.022) ( 0.036 )
Conservative 0.006 -0.007 0.031
( 0.021) ( 0.019) ( 0.036 )
Liberal Democrat -0.004 -0.027 0.139
( 0.032) ( 0.031) ( 0.057 )
Other -0.113 -0.094 -0.253
( 0.042) ( 0.039) ( 0.114 )
Sample size 1696.000 1696.000 1696.000
No of years 12.000 12.000 12.000
µ1 0.170 0.169 0.308
µ2 0.156 0.150 0.261
WClass 68.755 93.442 2.590
p value 0.000 0.000 0.459
WRegion 791.606 563.443 653.319
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
WY ear 28.146 35.488 14.514
p value 0.005 0.000 0.269
GLS estimates of (9). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation er-
ror in the districting advantage variable. Dependent variable in all regressions is log
employment.
µ1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and µ2 the common component to the stan-
dard error. WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di®erences, asymp-
totically distributed as Â
2
3. WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
8. WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2 with degrees of freedom one less than the number of
years.Table 8: Performance Regressions
% Rent Coll % Man costs Av rent Planning Bene¯t costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe® Coe®
Pro inc bias * Lab 0.052 -9.036 -1.981 -0.153 1.411
( 0.022) ( 2.681) ( 3.652) ( 0.096) ( 20.741 )
Pro inc bias * Con 0.085 2.781 7.828 0.049 9.752
( 0.059) ( 4.595) ( 6.836) ( 0.191) ( 37.352 )
Pro inc bias * Lib Dem 0.008 -0.977 -4.436 0.092 26.523
( 0.028) ( 2.763) ( 4.371) ( 0.137) ( 28.061 )
Pro inc bias * Oth -0.068 -4.650 -0.258 0.022 22.303
( 0.071) ( 8.340) ( 13.365) ( 0.248) ( 55.590 )
Characteristics
ln Average Income 0.007 1.876 4.245 0.193 7.580
( 0.026) ( 2.367) ( 3.549) ( 0.115) ( 22.410 )
ln Population 0.014 -0.668 0.827 -0.130 10.904
( 0.008) ( 0.846) ( 1.305) ( 0.037) ( 7.683 )
ln Unemployment -0.014 0.727 -0.636 0.086 -7.841
( 0.006) ( 0.594) ( 0.897) ( 0.027) ( 5.396 )
ln Per Capita Grant 0.006 1.142 1.027 -0.023 4.832
( 0.005) ( 0.512) ( 0.782) ( 0.023) ( 4.604 )
Political control
Labour 0.010 -0.186 -0.409 0.005 0.370
( 0.004) ( 0.335) ( 0.488) ( 0.018) ( 3.241 )
Conservative 0.005 0.205 0.539 0.010 -0.407
( 0.006) ( 0.516) ( 0.761) ( 0.027) ( 4.718 )
Liberal Democrat -0.001 -0.143 0.724 0.018 0.528
( 0.006) ( 0.623) ( 0.967) ( 0.027) ( 5.448 )
Other -0.012 -0.281 -0.638 -0.014 3.243
( 0.012) ( 1.387) ( 2.196) ( 0.043) ( 9.363 )
Sample size 516.000 517.000 517.000 569.000 567.000
No of years 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
µ1 0.017 2.281 4.126 0.079 20.266
µ2 0.013 1.009 1.622 0.068 11.297
WClass 5.580 12.877 2.012 12.820 2.688
p value 0.134 0.005 0.570 0.005 0.442
WRegion 9.612 108.087 175.649 22.768 64.867
p value 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
WY ear 1.629 6.850 57.180 5.454 4.751
p value 0.653 0.077 0.000 0.141 0.191
GLS estimates of (9). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to estimation er-
ror in the districting advantage variable. Dependent variable in all regressions is log
expenditure.
µ1 denotes the idiosyncratic component and µ2 the common component to the stan-
dard error. WClass is a Wald test of absence of authority class di®erences, asymp-
totically distributed as Â
2
3. WRegion is a Wald test of absence of regional di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
2
8. WY ear is a Wald test of absence of year di®erences,
asymptotically distributed as Â
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Figure 3. Distribution of electoral bias